

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NOMINATIONS OF JUDGES

QUESTIONNAIRE

Carolina Olarte Bácares - Colombia

A. Nomination process

1. The Statute requires every candidate for election to the Court to have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings or established competence in relevant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court.

Could you please describe your experience and competence in the areas specified below? For how long? In which capacity? (par. 2.2 of the Guiding Principles on National-level Procedures for Nominations of Judges of the International Criminal Court)

- a) A graduate and postgraduate legal education, recognizing assets of the postgraduate studies and specialization in the legal fields relevant for the work of the Court;
- b) Professional activities in relevant capacities such as judge, prosecutor, advocate, legal scholar or similar;
- c) Proven experience in dealing with complex criminal cases;
- d) Relevant international experience of the candidate, namely of his/her involvement in the broader field of international justice;
- e) Proven ability to work effectively with diverse and multicultural environment;
- f) Proven expertise and experience in the specific issues including but not limited to violence, discrimination, sexual assaults, or other similar conduct, inflicted on women and children;
- g) Proven knowledge of the main provisions of the Rome Statute and of the jurisprudence of the Court;
- h) Familiarity with the hybrid procedure governing the Court;
- i) Proven knowledge of the organization and functioning of the Court;
- j) Practical skills, including excellent knowledge of and fluency in at least one of the working languages of the Court.

For over twenty-five years of academic and professional experience, I have acquired knowledge and developed skills in international law. I am an expert in international humanitarian law, peacebuilding, international human rights law, and a diplomat, with a proven record in international judicial proceedings and the negotiation of international instruments.

I hold a PhD in Law from the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne a master's degree in international law from Robert Schuman University in Strasbourg, a Bachelor of Law

from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana of Bogotá, and I am admitted to practice law in Colombia by the since 2002.

Additionally, I undertook graduate-level studies and obtained diverse advanced certifications in international law, international humanitarian law, human rights and international negotiation from international academic institutions

My career as a legal scholar began in 2004 at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Colombia, as a teaching assistant until becoming a Full Professor. In the past two decades, I taught international law, international humanitarian law, European and Inter American human rights systems, international economic law, businesses and human rights, international investment arbitration, and legal research methodologies. I have taught as a visiting professor in 14 universities in the Americas and Europe. I have also lead and participated in various research projects always with a focus on international law and human rights.

In addition, I offered trainings for Colombian and Venezuelan magistrates and judges in international humanitarian law and human rights. I also served as a senior consultant in restorative justice, as well as in international humanitarian law and human rights. I have more than 40 publications, including books, book chapters, and journal articles, in Spanish, French, and English.

Apart from academic settings, I have also taught advanced courses in international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and human rights to commissioned and non-commissioned officers and operational legal advisers of the National Navy, the Air Force, the National Army, and the National Police. In this context, I have travelled to various military bases across the country for training sessions and support the development of 'Human Rights and IHL training lanes' amid the non-international armed conflict my country has experienced. This field work provided me with practical insights into the legal and contextual complexities that combatants face during the conduct of hostilities.

Aside to my academic experience, as a practitioner I have accumulated extensive experience as a co-agent, advocate and counsel, and independent expert in judicial proceedings before various international courts, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Court, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

The above, and my experience as a diplomat, particularly during the last four years as Ambassador of Colombia in the Netherlands and Permanent Representative to international judicial bodies based in The Hague, have allowed me to develop practical knowledge of the institutional functioning and dynamics of international courts in times where international institutions requires the commitment of all practitioners and Member States.

As the permanent representative of Colombia before the ICC, I participated in various working groups and facilitation sessions of the Hague Working Group, as well as multiple academic and outreach events of the ICC.

Colombia's hybrid model, which combine the written tradition of civil law, with the jurisprudential developments of common law, has trained me to understand the two global legal traditions. Furthermore, the Colombian criminal system, which include the victims' participation in the judicial proceedings, both in criminal proceedings and transitional justice, allows me to understand the relevance and the challenges of the ICC system.

Furthermore, I have developed an expertise in the specific issues including but not limited to violence, discrimination, sexual assaults, or other similar conduct, inflicted on women and children, in the field of international litigation, training and awareness-raising activities, and in the administrative-disciplinary sphere. In my capacity as an agent and counsel before the ICJ, I advocated for an approach that recognizes the differential impact of climate change and armed conflicts on women and girls. Throughout my diplomatic career, I have been actively involved in multilateral and bilateral forums related to the prevention of sexual violence in armed conflicts and the protection of particularly vulnerable populations. I have also been part of interdisciplinary teams focused on the prevention, support, and follow-up of cases involving gender-based violence and discrimination.

I have experience in working and leading multicultural legal teams in both academic and consulting settings. Likewise, as a diplomat, I have participated in the negotiation of international legal instruments and resolutions, both bilaterally and within the framework of the PCA, the OPCW, and the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC. As an international lawyer and coagent, I have led and worked in multicultural legal teams, developing group capabilities in fact analysis, legal research, and brief drafting. I have proven management, leadership, and negotiation skills, which I have applied across the duties I have performed and the positions I have held in diverse, multicultural environments throughout my career.

I am fluent in both of the Court's working languages. I have comprehensive and specialized knowledge of French, and an advanced command of English. In addition to English, I am also native in Spanish, and I have an advanced level in Italian. Additionally, I have a basic knowledge of Portuguese.

2. Have you ever been investigated for, charged with, or otherwise been the subject of any disciplinary, administrative, civil or criminal proceedings involving allegations of corruption, criminal or administrative negligence, misconduct, including sexual harassment, or any matter calling into question your professional or ethical standing? If yes, please provide full details, including any determinations or outcomes.

No, I have never been investigated for, or charged with, any disciplinary, administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings involving allegations of corruption, criminal or administrative negligence, misconduct, including sexual harassment, or any matter calling into question my professional or ethical standing.

B. Perception of the Court

1. What is your vision of the International Criminal Court and its dual nature as a court and an international organization? How do you see the main differences between the ICC and the two *ad hoc* Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda?

The ICC has been established as both an international organization and a court. This structure has been seen as a guarantee of its proper functioning, since, in its capacity as an international organization, the States Parties to the Rome Statute exercise their governance, ensuring its funding and the careful preparation and implementation of its budget. Similarly, in exercising its administrative functions, it guides—through the decisions of the Assembly of States Parties—the work of the Presidency, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry. This separation of functions also enables the Court to strengthen cooperation with States and other relevant actors, and to maintain and develop

fluid relationships with them, as well as with civil society, other organizations, and actors that are crucial to the fulfilment of its mandate.

As a court, this dual structure also guarantees its independence and impartiality from any political interference by states.

The Independent Review Mechanism, in its September 2020 Report identified three areas of governance within the International Criminal Court: the ICC's judicial functions, the administration of justice, and the administration of the international organization. Despite balancing these functions not being a straightforward mission, the International Criminal Court has demonstrated a strong capacity to harmoniously manage this dual nature. In fact, this framework has led to the adoption of strategies and measures designed to safeguard its mandate, whilst preventing undue interference with judicial independence, including cyberattacks, unilateral coercive measures against many of its elected officials, and issues with workplace culture.

Both the ICC and the *ad hoc* tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were created to ensuring that international crimes do not remain unpunished. To that extent, both initiatives incorporate the fundamental principles of human dignity and retributive justice. They represent the evolution of international criminal law with respect to (i) the assessment of the nature and scope of international crimes; (ii) the implementation of technical procedures for attributing responsibility in situations of the widespread and systematic commission of such crimes; and (iii) the determination of legal consequences for the determination of criminal responsibility of individuals with authority and command capacity, and the legal standards of aiding and abetting.

However, it is possible to identify some differences between the ICC and these *ad hoc* tribunals, which are determined by historical and technical considerations.

The Security Council created the ad-hoc tribunals under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They emerged to respond effectively to specific situations with a limited, time-bound mandate and jurisdiction: armed conflicts that, due to their dynamics of massive and systematic violence, had the potential to generate near-failed states and to affect regional stability. The jurisdiction of both ad-hoc tribunals was limited to certain territories.

For its part, the ICC was created by an international treaty adopted in 1998 by 120 States. It should be appreciated as one of the pillars of the global project that has sought to consolidate an international community founded on norms and institutions that represent common interests and function through cooperative dynamics. The Court crystallizes many years of discussions and experiences regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, which highlight the need for a permanent and autonomous international institution to prosecute and punish the most serious international crimes and to exercise leadership and coordination among States Parties so that they fulfil their obligations to combat impunity for such crimes at the domestic level. Therefore, the ICC incorporated many of the developments made in the field of *ad hoc* tribunals to consolidate a system of international criminal responsibility that, unlike those earlier efforts, goes beyond the retributive approach to criminal justice and considers the possibility of contributing to reparations for victims and the reconciliation of societies affected by these criminal acts.

2. What would be the main criticisms you are aware of in relation to the Court's proceedings?

Several categories of criticism have been raised in academic literature, by civil society, and by States Parties regarding the Court's proceedings. While many of these critiques reflect broader structural challenges inherent to international criminal justice, they nonetheless warrant careful consideration. I would group them into five main areas.

First, concerns have been expressed about perceived political influence on the Court's work, particularly in the opening of investigations. It has been argued that decisions to initiate preliminary examinations or investigations may be affected by the interests of certain States Parties or by patterns of cooperation and non-cooperation. Research suggests that member states' preferences can shape case selection at the preliminary examination stage, and that cooperation in issuing arrest warrants may depend on political alignments.

Second, the Court faces structural limitations that affect the implementation of its decisions. Because the ICC has no police force, it relies entirely on State cooperation to execute arrest warrants, collect evidence, or transfer detainees. Several high-profile fugitives have travelled to States Parties without being arrested, illustrating the challenges of the Court's enforcement capacity. Recent instances of unilateral coercive measures imposed on some elected officials and judges by non-States Parties have also raised concerns about the Court's ability to operate without external interference. These challenges highlight concerns about the Court's judicial authority and its practical ability to secure compliance.

Third, the ICC has been criticized for its inefficiency, case selection, and the complexity of proceedings. Specific criticisms have been made regarding the difficulties that arise for victims in the cases to fully understand the procedures, manage their expectations regarding access to truth and reparation measures, and participate effectively and within reasonable timeframes.

Fourth, the Court has faced criticism for insufficient progress in prosecuting certain categories of crimes, particularly sexual and gender-based violence. Observers have noted that relatively few such cases have reached trial, despite the prevalence of these crimes in many situations under investigation. Concerns include the difficulty of evidence gathering, the risk of re-traumatization of victims, and the perception that these crimes are sometimes treated as secondary charges. This highlights the need for judges with a gender perspective, which would be reflected in a consolidation of case law addressing this category of crimes.

Fifth, commentators have identified procedural and institutional inefficiencies, including management challenges and internal governance issues. The hybrid procedural system has been described as cumbersome, particularly with respect to victim participation and the volume of interlocutory appeals. Additionally, some high-profile discharges after lengthy proceedings have prompted debate about prosecutorial strategy and the Court's ability to secure convictions in complex cases.

3. Do you have any suggestions on changes that could be proposed in order to improve the perception of the Court in the eyes of the international community?

Improving the perception of the Court requires addressing both the substantive criticisms raised over the years and the structural constraints under which the institution operates. I would highlight several areas where changes could enhance the Court's perception.

First, strengthening consistency, clarity, and quality of judicial decision-making would help address concerns about uneven jurisprudence, procedural complexity, and efficiency. Practitioners have noted that greater consistency in how Chambers assess evidence and apply procedural rules would improve confidence in the Court's work. Clearer reasoning, more predictable approaches to interlocutory issues, and streamlined procedures—particularly regarding victim participation and evidentiary matters—could reduce perceptions of fragmentation and inefficiency.

Second, enhancing the Court's communication strategy would help counter misinformation, improve public understanding of its mandate and limitations and facilitate its decentralization to bring the institution closer to regions and Member States. Observers have emphasized the need for more proactive and transparent communication, including regular public briefings, clearer press releases, and meaningful engagement on social media. Effective communication is essential to managing expectations, especially regarding the Court's dependence on State cooperation and the challenges inherent in investigating crimes in conflict settings.

Third, States Parties could consider plausible and targeted reforms to strengthen cooperation and reduce the Court's vulnerability to political pressure. It has been suggested that amending the Rome Statute to reinforce cooperation obligations, or exploring mechanisms inspired by the *ad hoc* tribunals—such as more robust international backing for arrest operations—could reduce the perception that political interests shape the Court's work. While universal jurisdiction or universal membership may not be immediately attainable, incremental steps to broaden support and reduce selective cooperation would enhance the Court's legitimacy.

Fourth, reinforcing the Court's complementary role as a Court of last resort, further supporting domestic justice systems would improve perceptions of fairness and effectiveness. Strengthening complementarity not only aligns with the Statute's design but also demonstrates that the Court is part of a broader ecosystem of accountability, rather than the sole or primary venue for justice.

Fifth, improving internal management, governance, and workplace culture would address concerns about institutional inefficiencies. Critics have pointed to management failures, heavy procedures, and internal disputes that have affected the Court's reputation. A structured review of internal operations could help identify areas for improvement and foster a greater sense of ownership among staff in demanding situations.

4. Which are, in your view, the most important decisions issued by the Court in the past years, that have had an important impact in relation to its perception *vis-à-vis* the States Parties and the public? Could you give and explain at least one positive and one negative example?

Several recent decisions of the Court have had a significant impact on the progressive evolution of international criminal law and on how States Parties and the broader public perceive the ICC. In any case, I believe it is not possible to label these decisions in absolute terms—that is, as entirely positive or negative—but rather in terms of the perspective of the actor analyzing their content and scope. To that end, I will refer to the various perceptions that have arisen regarding some of the Court's decisions, in order to illustrate the inherent challenges that the institution faces in responding to the diverse expectations of the international community.

The sentence against *Bosco Ntaganda* is considered a historic milestone for the development of the Court's understanding of international crimes because it recognized that sexual and gender-based crimes can simultaneously constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. Indeed, the Court's jurisdiction over sexual crimes committed within an armed group (intra-rank violence) has been upheld, including when the victims were child soldiers recruited by that same group.

From the standpoint of victims reparations, the *Al-Hassan Reparations Order* (April 2026) represents one of the most comprehensive and forward-looking reparations frameworks adopted by the Court to date, since it demonstrates the Court's capacity to deliver meaningful reparations, to innovate within the Rome Statute's framework, and to respond to victims' needs in a transparent and principled manner.

In turn, the *Bemba* appeals procedure portrays the tensions that may arise in the dissimilar interpretation of the essential elements of the modes of attribution—in this case, the assessment of command responsibility and the degree of control. Herein, the representatives of the victims displayed concerns about the consistency of the Court's jurisprudence. Other concerns have been expressed on the acquittal and subsequent ratification of that decision for former Ivorian President *Laurent Gbagbo*, due to the apparent lack of solid evidence presented by the prosecution and the perception of impunity for the victims of the post-election crisis.

All in all, managing the diverse perceptions of States Parties, civil society, and victims is and will remain a constant challenge for the ICC. This is because issuing such decisions will always depend on the convergence of factual elements, procedural tools, and substantive criteria considered by judges on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, preserving the judge's capacity for consistency and independence is fundamental to meeting the expectations of legality and legitimacy of the various actors involved.

C. Judge's independence

1. What in your view should be the relationship between a Judge and the authorities of his or her country of origin? Similarly, how do you envisage your future relationship with bodies such as universities, courts or non-governmental organizations with which you have been involved or to which you have been affiliated, if elected to the ICC?

Following article 40 of the Rome Statute and article 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics, the relationship between a judge of the Court and the authorities of their country must be characterized by complete independence and autonomy. These relationships must be based on respect and transparency toward all States Parties to the Rome Statute, and consequently toward all members of the Assembly of States Parties, as well as on the exclusion of any conflict of interest.

To the same extent, a judge must avoid any relationship with the authorities of his or her country of origin that could affect his or her independence and impartiality. His or her conduct, as well as his or her judicial activity, must always be objective, rejecting any form of instruction, influence, or direct or indirect pressure, as well as any bias in favor of or against his or her home country or any other country.

In the performance of their judicial duties, judges must always respect and uphold their loyalty to the ICC. To this end, judges must never represent a particular state, but rather the interests derived from the mandate established by the Rome Statute, which ultimately takes shape in the institution's judicial work.

In the same line, if elected as an ICC judge, I would strive to have a constructive exchange relationship with all the States Parties to the ICC and their domestic authorities, one based on transparency and the necessary independence of judicial operators, without displaying any kind of preferences.

In my particular case, a large part of my professional career has been in academia, in Colombia, the Americas, and Europe. Likewise, in the context of my work as an international lawyer and human rights expert, I have had the opportunity to interact with several regional, local, and international tribunals and non-governmental organizations. If elected as a judge of the ICC, I would strive for constructive exchanges with all actors in the judiciary and civil society, grounded in transparency and the necessary independence of judicial officers, without showing any favoritism.

I will take advantage of this close relationship to continue my pedagogical work on international law, the importance of international justice, and especially the work of the ICC. Therefore, I intend to contribute to the dissemination of the corresponding contents, including the jurisprudence produced by the institution, and to participate in academic and outreach events. I expect to do it by respecting the obligations imposed on judges by the Rome Statute and other legal instruments, and in particular, the rules on judicial ethics and deontology.

These interactions also promote greater learning among judges, insofar as they offer spaces to listen to and engage with society and provide significant opportunities for other entities to contribute to the institution's mission and commitment to its strengthening.

2. In your view, can a Judge participate in a trial involving a national from his or her country of origin? Why?

In principle, I believe that a judge could participate in a trial involving a national of his or her home state. Indeed, judges are selected for their legal expertise and qualifications, as well as for their demonstrated integrity and independence.

Furthermore, judges are chosen to perform their duties with objectivity and impartiality toward any person, regardless of their national origin. It is worth noting that, in principle, no specific rule expressly and unequivocally prohibits a judge from hearing or sitting on a case involving a fellow national. However, when analyzing each situation, the judge must review the applicable rules—such as Articles 40 and 41 of the Rome Statute on judicial independence, recusal, and challenge of judges, as well as Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Code of Judicial Ethics—to ensure that their impartiality is not compromised.

For this reason, a case-by-case analysis is essential, and one must always carefully consider whether one's independence and impartiality could be compromised; in such a case, it would be not only beneficial but also advisable to discuss the matter with the presiding judge and, if necessary, with the ethics committees established within the court, so as to decide whether to hear the case or recuse oneself.

In any case, the critical issue in this decision relates to the apparent conflict of interest. In that regard and considering the nature and complexity of cases before the ICC, as well as their high risk of politicization, the judge must carefully scrutinize the potential perception of bias that would arise from hearing or deciding a case involving a fellow national. In such situations, it may be preferable to recuse oneself from the case to ensure that the integrity of the proceedings is not compromised.

3. Which jurisprudence/decisions do you consider necessary, useful and appropriate to be considered during proceedings at the ICC? From national courts? From international courts? From Human Rights bodies?

Article 21 of the Rome Statute constitutes the first codification of the sources of international criminal law and is central to understanding how sources are applied at the ICC. This article establishes a hierarchy of applicable law for the Court, beginning with article 21(1)(a), which affirms the primacy of the Rome Statute, the elements of crimes, and the rules of procedure and evidence as the main sources of law at the Court.

Article 21(1)(b) then allows the Court, 'where appropriate' or in other words, on its discretion to apply 'treaties and the principles and rules of international law.' The inclusion of the word 'principles' has generally been understood to refer to at least customary international law. In this line, the Court has drawn on case law and previous decisions of the *ad hoc* tribunals, as they have identified legal principles of international law. The relevance of such decisions is reinforced by looking at Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, which refers to judicial decisions as a subsidiary means of determining the rules of law and can be deemed to reflect a general methodological approach to international law.

In any event, this does not mean that the jurisprudence of other Courts is automatically applicable to the Court, nor that it constitutes a binding precedent for it, but rather that the Court can enrich its interpretation and ascertain the existence of the principle or rule in question. Consequently, the Court may accord certain weight to prior decisions of other international courts and tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, yet, in doing so, it should be careful to account for specific differences with the Rome Statute, such as those arising from the hybrid nature of the ICC or from issues concerning victims' participation.

In a similar manner, Article 21(1)(c) provides the Court with the possibility to subsidiarily apply the general principles of law derived by it from 'national laws of legal systems of the world, including, as appropriate, the national laws of States'. Thus, the jurisprudence of national courts and human rights bodies may prove useful to the ICC's interpretation, particularly in light of the need to identify general principles of law. Likewise, Article 21(2) states that 'the Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. In this line, the Court has the discretion to use its own jurisprudence, but it is not bound to do so. As such, if elected as a judge for the ICC, I would opt to use jurisprudence as a subsidiary source of interpretation insofar as it helps clarify the Rome Statute, elements of crimes, and Rules.

Article 21(3) refers to the need for the Court to guarantee that the 'application and interpretation of law' of all the sources previously mentioned 'is consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds' such as gender, 'age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.' Thus, the Court should consider the relevant jurisprudence of regional courts such as the ECHR and the IACtHR especially when dealing with human rights issues.

4. In your view, what should be the approach of an independent Judge when faced with precedents established by the Appeals Chamber of the Court?

As provided in Article 40 of the Rome Statute, judicial independence is one of the cornerstones of the ICC's work, insofar as judges must exercise their functions with

complete autonomy. In accordance with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, judges must resolve the cases before them impartially, free from any restrictions, undue influence, inducements, pressure, threats, or interference.

Indeed, in determining the applicable law in article 21, the Court must apply in the first place, the Rome Statute, the elements of the crimes, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Nevertheless, the Statute also indicates that the Court “may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions” (art 21(2)). Yet it does not establish a system of binding precedent and thus excludes the common-law doctrine of *stare decisis*; furthermore, the Statute does not seem to indicate any hierarchical difference between the decisions of the Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals Chambers of the Court.

In fact, the Court has issued key decisions in which it has re-evaluated or modified its previous positions to adjust the scope of its jurisdiction (*Al-Bashir Case*), the responsibility of superiors (*Bemba Case*), or the principle of complementarity (Philippines Situation). In turn, I believe this principle does not conflict with the ability of the ICC judges to follow precedents established by the Appeals Chamber. In fact, judges are free to assess and consider their previous decisions to the extent that they serve to develop understanding and interpretation of the law.

In relation to the weight and importance that should be afforded to the precedents of the Appeals Chambers, I believe that, insofar as it is crucial to strengthen the expected legal certainty derived from consistent and established jurisprudence, any departure from the precedents of the Appeals Chamber should be carefully measured in order to preserve the reliability and authority of the ICC. As such, any decision to depart from previous jurisprudence should be made only where this is justified and convincing, and with the aim of reflecting the flexibility necessary to adapt and harmonize the case law to changes in society or to specific facts. In this regard, it is common for the Chambers of the ICC to refer to previous decisions to maintain uniformity, guarantee legal certainty, and ensure predictable treatment for victims and defendants.

All in all, I consider it is possible to harmonize the work of an independent judge, who seeks to resolve a case without external influences based on his or her knowledge and factual and legal assessment, with the existence of tools for interpreting and applying norms that ensure the consistency of the international criminal law system. Furthermore, I believe in the relevance and benefits of establishing lines of jurisprudence that enable the institution to act reliably in cases where arguments or positions can be applied to similar situations.

5. Do you consider that a Judge or a Chamber of the Court, in order to ensure efficiency, should be allowed to implement innovative procedural practices? If yes, please give examples.

The rules of the ICC, particularly the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, reflect the decision of the States Parties to establish a well-defined procedure to guarantee due process and equality of arms. Adherence to these rules ensures consistency in judicial practice and fosters confidence in the proceedings and the applicable rules. However, it is entirely possible to implement innovative procedural practices, to achieve efficiency in the work of the chambers, to grant full effectiveness of the substantive rules, and to safeguard the rights of the parties.

In the same line, the Court's Strategic Plan 2026-2029 established as one of its strategic objectives "to enhance the efficiency and expeditiousness of the Court's core activities (preliminary examinations, investigations, trials, appeals, and reparations) while maintaining the highest legal standards of independence, fairness, and quality." Therefore, judges and the chambers should always contribute to the administration of justice fairly, effectively, and promptly. They can do so by adhering to the advisory deadlines set out in the Chambers Practice Manual, or by proposing new practices open to discussion with their peers and other members of the legal teams, who may ultimately adopt them.

Accordingly, if elected as an ICC judge, I would advocate for the implementation of practices that allow the various procedural stages in which judges intervene to proceed expeditiously, while maintaining standards of legality and transparency, and preserving the rights of all parties and the public interest.

Concrete examples of these measures include the use of strategic planning and project management tools; the consideration of future scenario analysis to anticipate the emergence of possible elements that might delay the process; and the use of technological and artificial intelligence tools to assist judicial work through the provision of information, the preliminary analysis of content already submitted to the process, or the remote conduct of judicial proceedings when required to protect the rights of the parties.

6. How do you envisage working with a hybrid criminal procedure, different from the one you experienced in your national functions? How do you envisage your working relationship with other Judges from different backgrounds and from different legal systems?

Since 2004, Colombia has transformed its criminal justice system, which was originally civil-based, into a mixed model incorporating certain elements of the common law tradition. Therefore, working within the context of a hybrid court such as the ICC will not pose a challenge. This, combined with the pioneering judicial norms and institutions of transitional justice that have been developing in my country since 2011 – which incorporate the participation and the centrality of victims in proceedings, enables me to work comfortably within the context of a hybrid criminal procedure such as that of the ICC.

The ICC is an institution that serves as one of the cornerstones of multilateralism and the international legal order. As such, its nature is unique, as it operates within a decentralized and non-hierarchical community of states, seeking to coordinate criminal justice systems with diverse approaches to investigate, prosecute, and punish international crimes fairly and consistently. Therefore, one of the Court's major challenges is to embody the different contexts and legal systems of its States Parties in order to produce pluralistic and representative decisions. This explains why, within the framework of the ICC, hybrid criminal procedures incorporating various international and domestic elements have been adopted.

If elected as a judge of the ICC, I would strive to be consistent with the principle that, as an international court, no normative approach can be perceived as more relevant than another. On the contrary, it is essential to find appropriate compromises among the major criminal law systems to resolve the substantive and procedural dilemmas that arise in the exercise of judicial functions. In particular, my experience and skills in international law and restorative justice allow me to adapt to the specific context of the Court's hybrid criminal procedures, so that my knowledge related to my national duties would not hinder

my ability to exercise my judicial duties in a manner consistent with the objective and scope of this decision-making framework.

If elected as a judge of the Court, I will seek to be faithful to the dynamics under which the institution has consolidated itself as a scenario for building international justice based on well-defined principles and values but also founded on collegiality and professionalism as established in article 5 of the Court's Judicial Code of Ethics.

In this context, my working relationship with the other judges would be characterized by (i) cooperation, in the sense of bringing knowledge and experiences from my own professional career to ensure effective and efficient criminal justice; and (ii) cross-fertilization, insofar as the diversity of contexts and approaches to law can facilitate the evolution of new ways of assuming the criminal judicial function that respond to the present and future challenges that the court must assume. To achieve this, I will continue to prioritize a spirit of openness and the ability to adapt whenever the situation requires it.

7. Are you used to working as part of a team? How would you deal with a disagreement in relation to a certain aspect of a decision? What are your views in relation to writing separate concurring and dissenting opinions?

Throughout my professional career, I have had the opportunity to work as part of managerial, academic, consultative and legal teams, in various roles ranging from leadership and coordination to collegial decision-making. As dean of the law school at my *alma mater*, I have been responsible for leading large and diverse teams. My approach to teamwork—as well as in my capacity as a member of various councils, steering committees, and boards of directors—has always been to remain attentive, respect differences and opposing views, and employ techniques that bridge communication gaps and facilitate effective decision-making.

As a researcher and consultant, I have led interdisciplinary projects involving students, professors, lawyers, and professionals from various universities and different countries, resulting in the production of complex and rigorous scientific papers and reports. As an international lawyer and, in particular, as a co-agent, I have led legal teams comprising lawyers and scientific experts from diverse legal backgrounds, nationalities, and languages, with whom we have drafted briefs and submissions before various international courts. I have always prioritized leadership and collaborative work, as well as constructive deliberation and decision-making by consensus.

Within the context of the ICC, and to fulfill its judicial function, the institution was designed as a collegial judicial body. Thus, in accordance with Articles 74 and 83 of the Rome Statute, decisions are made after deliberations on their most important legal and factual aspects and are based on the majority support of the judges. In cases where judges disagree on decision-making and based on the same rules of the Rome Statute, I believe that the ultimate good—the need to issue a decision efficiently, fairly, effectively, and promptly—requires the application of the democratic majority rule, as stated in article 74(3). In any case, and in line with the Rome Statute, I believe it is essential that when there is no unanimity on the grounds supporting the judgments, these judicial documents must contain all the viewpoints expressed during the process, as stated in article 74(5), so that interested parties, and the international community in general, can be informed of the details of the deliberative process, thus ensuring transparency.

Furthermore, I consider it of utmost importance that judges whose views do not align with the majority opinion be able to issue separate or dissenting opinions on the legal issues at hand under article 83(4). Their pronouncements should not be interpreted as a lack of legitimacy or institutional weakness, but rather as a guarantee for the functioning of the system. First, it ensures that disagreements do not hinder the fulfillment of the institutional mandate. Second, it safeguards the rights of the parties because it fulfills the requirement of transparency in all aspects of the criminal proceedings. Third, it contributes to the evolution of international criminal law, since the judges' opinions are informed by reasoning that can be considered the foundation for the development of norms and interpretations.

Nevertheless, I believe that judges should make rational and responsible use of these opinions, limiting them exclusively to fundamental differences and avoiding excessive fragmentation of the reasoning. In any case, these opinions must always be rigorous, drafted with technical skill and restraint, to avoid making disparaging remarks or casting doubt on the consistency of the court's decision and the decision-making process.

8. Have you considered the risk of being subject to sanctions imposed by one or more States due to the exercise of your judicial functions?

The International Criminal Court's mandate is that of 125 states and is grounded in the expectations of victims and communities affected by the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. For this reason, the independence of judges is paramount to maintaining a system that guarantees fairness and legitimacy. Regrettably, today, several judges are being targeted with coercive measures for carrying out their duties and upholding their judicial oath.

I am fully informed of and aware of the content and consequences of the measures taken against numerous elected officials of the ICC. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that assuming the highest offices, such as being elected as Judge of the ICC, always entails facing various challenges. Given the current tension between the interests of certain countries and the fulfillment of the Court's mandate, it cannot be ruled out that, as has already occurred in recent months, new sanctions will be imposed on elected members of the institution. However, I also consider that this is a phenomenon that should never transcend the fulfillment of the institutional mandate, which is fundamental to the international community.

I have witnessed the professionalism and resilience with which the judges have continued to fulfill their responsibilities by adjudicating complex cases subject to the highest levels of public scrutiny, whilst upholding due process and safeguarding the rights of the parties, despite all attempts at interference and external pressure. In this regard, I am fully aware of and prepared to take on the challenges of serving as an independent and impartial judge at the ICC during these turbulent times.

D. Workload of the Court

1. Are you prepared and available to serve at the commencement and for the duration of your term, if elected and if called to work at the Court full-time?

Yes, I am fully prepared and available to exercise my functions on a full-time basis from the outset and for the entire duration of my mandate, in order to dedicate myself fully to the mission of the Court.

2. Work as a Judge of the ICC frequently involves many hours a day, including into the evenings and over some weekends. Holidays can only be taken at fixed periods during the year when, for instance, there are no hearings. Are you prepared for that?

Yes, throughout my career, I have taken on professional challenges with similar demands in terms of workload and time commitment. Therefore, I am willing and prepared to serve as a judge of the Court under these circumstances.

3. The Court has two working languages. What is your opinion about this matter? How could multilingual challenges be better addressed by International Criminal Court judges ?

I believe that, given the diversity that characterizes the ICC, both in its composition and in the working dynamics of all its organs, having two working languages is appropriate. As I am familiar with both working languages, but bearing in mind that French is my first foreign language, I would be keen to promote greater use of French in order to continue contributing to the necessary balance, not only from a strictly linguistic perspective, but also to ensure that the geographical and cultural representation of the various legal systems remains equally balanced.

However, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50(2) of the Statute and Rule 41, the Presidency may, in certain cases, authorize the use of another official language as a working language. This provision serves to promote linguistic diversity, which undoubtedly fosters inclusive and pluralistic dialogue amongst colleagues, as well as with the parties involved in the proceedings, and contributes to a greater sense of the Court's universality.

Similarly, as a native Spanish speaker, and given my advanced level of Italian and my basic level of Portuguese, I am fully convinced of the importance of multilingualism, particularly among judges. This is because it enables them to better understand different legal cultures and the specific characteristics and nuances of the contexts in which the crimes before the court occur.

Finally, multilingualism within the court, and in particular within the judicial division, is a valuable tool that could be used to broaden and enhance the effectiveness of its outreach. In this way, the court's work would be more accessible to all members of the international community. Lastly, promoting greater multilingualism would help to strengthen partnerships with institutions around the world, such as academic institutions and other local courts, and could serve as a vehicle for fostering multicultural openness within the Court itself, which is composed of people from all over the world with a wide variety of cultural and linguistic traditions.

4. What is your approach to writing decisions? Will you undertake this work yourself? To what extent would you delegate drafting to assistants or interns?

Written decisions are the foundation of judicial activity and should therefore be maintained as the primary product of the Court's judicial proceedings. It is important to consider the opportunity to produce a written decision in clear and concise terms, so that its content is accessible not only to legal practitioners but also to suspects and accused, victims, civil society, and other interested parties.

If elected as an ICC judge, I would take a direct part in the process of structuring and drafting legal documents. Although the Court judges have the support of professionals specialized in this task, the decision-making process requires an active role from the judge, their knowledge, previous experiences, and legal approach to obtaining the best possible result.

To that extent, assistants or interns could provide essential support in the development of legal and factual research, as well as in drafting specific portions of the decisions under the judge's guidance. In any case, the judge must always be responsible for establishing the line of reasoning, guiding the work of their assistants, and directly drafting and assembling the most relevant elements of the decisions.

5. Which are, in your view, the decisions that could and should be issued by a Single Judge in order to expedite proceedings?

Article 39(2)(b)(iii) provides that the functions of a Pre-Trial Chamber may be carried out by 'a single judge of that division in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence'. However, Rule 7(2) specifies that they can only do so in relation to those 'decisions on those questions on which decision by the full Chamber is not expressly provided for in the Statute or the Rules'. Consequently, the work of a single judge is limited, and it might never relate to decisions issued under Article 15, 18, 19, 54(2), 61(7), and 72 of the Rome Statute, as stressed by Article 57(2)(b) and those reserved by the Rules namely, the review of the decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation (Rule 108 and 110) and the decisions in respect to unique investigative opportunity under Article 56 (Rule 114).

The option for the Court to designate a single judge is intended to facilitate the work of the Pre-Trial Chamber and to afford the Court greater flexibility and efficiency. In this sense, it is possible for the Chamber to appoint one or more single judges for different issues relating to the management of the proceedings, such as disclosure of evidence, page limits, and time frames, which can further decrease the workload of the whole chamber and at the same time utilize the individual expertise of judges within the Pre Trial Chamber. For instance, it can be useful to have multiple single judges in a case, as was done in *Kony and others* case, which deals with divergent sets of issues such as the unsealing of evidence and victims' and witnesses' protections.

Nevertheless, the single judge should be careful when making determinations, particularly those that can have effects that extend to the trial stage, deal with unsettled legal issues or gaps in interpretation, as well as those that specifically affect the rights of the accused or imply certain investigative powers on behalf of the Judge. In such situations, I believe, the single judge should refer the situation to the full Chamber.

6. Are you used to working under pressure from States, governmental authorities, national or international organizations, the media or the wider public? Can you provide an example?

Some of the professional positions I previously held involved being part of decision-making processes with a significant impact on the perceptions and interests of various actors, including public authorities, domestic and international organizations, the media, and ultimately, public opinion. In 2020, I was selected and appointed as the first female dean in the history of one of the country's oldest and most influential law schools. My

appointment and my tenure brought about a profound change that shook the legal culture of my community and attracted enormous attention and constant media scrutiny.

However, the moment when I was probably under the greatest pressure came in 2022, when I was appointed by the Colombian government as co-agent before the International Court of Justice in what was arguably the most significant series of international cases in my country's recent history, as it involved the national interest in fundamental matters relating to historical, sovereignty, and territorial issues. My role, as well as my decisions, were subject to pressure from high-level political and legal figures.

The various stages of the process, right up to its successful conclusion, attracted constant scrutiny from many sectors and local communities, as well as interest from the media and the public at large. I am therefore accustomed to situations of intense political and media pressure, and these have not affected the professional and ethical conduct of my duties. On the contrary, they have enabled me to strengthen my ability to remain unaffected by any attempted influence, as well as to react and respond as a spokesperson to constant requests from the media, always following the channels and procedures governing my role.

Therefore, I understand the nature and scope of the pressures that these types of interactions can generate in positions such as the one I am running for. To that extent, I believe that ICC judges should strive to maintain distance from such actors in order to carry out their judicial functions with autonomy and transparency. This is without prejudice to my belief that it is possible to build bridges with actors such as States Parties and civil society—including organizations and academic institutions—in order to present the results of the Court's work and reflect on its impacts.

7. Are you in a health condition allowing you to work under pressure, given the Court's heavy workload?

Yes, I am in good health and prepared to work under pressure. To date, I have not been on leave from my professional duties due to the conditions mentioned in the question.

E. Deontology

1. What is your definition and understanding of an independent Judge?

An independent judge is one who, while aware of the implications of exercising their judicial functions, maintains a general attitude of detachment from situations that could compromise their fair and impartial performance in that activity. As stated in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and complemented by the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, this postulate directly impacts the fulfillment of the objectives of the administration of justice, since, as a consequence of its observance, judges are able to conduct judicial proceedings equitably, and the rights of the parties are respected.

In the context of the ICC, the Rome Statute and the Code of Judicial Ethics provide specific conduct guidelines, enlightening judges' activity toward the full observance of independence. On the one hand, judges may not engage in any professional occupation other than that associated with their position. On the other hand, they must decide without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats, or interference,

whether direct or indirect, and exercise their judicial function solely on the basis of their assessment of the facts of each case, and in accordance with applicable law.

Ultimately, judicial independence goes beyond being a procedural principle and extends to substantive matters such as how judges approach cases involving individuals from specific social groups or in situations of particular vulnerability. For example, according to the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, adopting a gender perspective in judicial proceedings can directly contribute to strengthening judicial independence and impartiality. This, since recognizing the need to implement differential criteria to neutralize unconscious biases, facilitates that judges may produce decisions that are truly blind to prejudice rather than inadvertently upholding them.

2. In your view, what would constitute a conflict of interest for a Judge?

Following the developments taken place within the Ethics Office of the United Nations, a conflict of interest has been defined as one that occurs when the private interests of officials, such as external relations (familiar, personal or work relations), or financial assets, interfere—or appear to interfere—with the interests of the organization, including the fulfillment of the mandates of its bodies and institutions, making it difficult for officials to perform their duties impartially, independently and objectively. Therefore, private or personal matters must be sufficiently separated from the exercise of professional functions to prevent any influence or interference of any kind and, therefore, ensure that no private interests are at stake.

In my view, within the context of the administration of justice, a conflict of interest arises when the impartial exercise of judicial functions may be in doubt for any reason. A judge must always, proactively and within the framework of their legal obligations and their duty of due diligence, prevent any conflict of interest from arising and affecting the performance of their duties, by means of the obligation of transparency. In other words, they must always disclose such conflicts through the channels provided for that purpose and handle them in accordance with the provisions of Article 41 of the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 33, 34 and 35.

Article 41 of the Rome Statute points out that a judge may be disqualified if he or she has been involved under any capacity in a case before either the ICC or any other judicial institution that comprised the person under investigation or accused. Additionally, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide a clear set of situations when a judge might be disqualified from performing judicial functions if there is: (i) a personal interest in the case due to pre-existing personal or professional relationships with the parties; (ii) prior involvement in legal proceedings in which the person under investigation or accused was the opposing party; (iii) performance of duties through which the judge could have formed an opinion about the case in question, the parties, or their representatives, which could objectively affect their impartiality; or (iv) expression of opinions through the media or public actions.

Ultimately, as suggested by the Code of Judicial Ethics, I believe that, should this type of situation take place, the involved judge must assume a proactive approach and recuse themselves from the corresponding decision-making process.

3. Should considerations relating to race, colour, gender or religion be taken into account when assessing a candidate's suitability to be a judge at the ICC? Why?

I consider that a candidate's suitability to be a judge of the Court cannot be determined under any circumstances based on criteria of race, color, or religion, which refer to distinctive characteristics of individuals that have nothing to do with their potential performance in the administration of international criminal justice.

Ensuring diversity in the composition of the ICC is undoubtedly a relevant criterion for the selection process of the Court's judges. However, I believe that diversity has been developed through the institutional mandate to be understood, today, in terms of gender parity, balanced regional presence, and representation of the world's diverse legal systems.

4. What measures and decisions would you take, if you are elected, to ensure the effective participation by victims in the proceedings?

Historically, victims played a very limited role in international criminal justice, being considered merely as witnesses in an adversarial process. The Rome Statute marks, in this sense, a significant development, as it not only recognizes victims as participants but also provides a robust framework for their protection and participation at the various stages of the proceedings, including reparations (article 68 of the Rome Statute and Section III Rules). This framework recognizes not only the importance of their contributions to clarifying certain elements of the crimes studied by the Court, but also that their interests may differ from those of the Prosecutor and States in the proceedings.

The Statute and the Rules grant the Chambers discretion to determine who qualifies as a victim under 68(3) and when and how they may exercise their rights (Rule 89). Considering the overarching position and the importance of ensuring victims are heard, I believe it is essential to allow and balance victims' participation from an early stage in the proceedings. In this sense, I consider that it is important to assess applications with due regard to the broad definition of "victim" under Rule 85 and ensure that participation is permitted whenever victims' personal interests are affected, as stressed in the early ICC case law (*Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*).

Likewise, I believe it is important to promote clarity and transparency in judicial decisions concerning participation. In this line, it is relevant the A-B-C grouping approach taken in the Chambers practice manual. The approach not only aids in the adequate management of the universe of victims and reduces time frames for decision-making but also guarantees legal certainty and contributes to the consistent application of the Court's jurisprudence across Chambers.

Furthermore, I consider it of key importance to make active use of the Chamber's authority under Article 64 to structure proceedings in a manner that ensures fairness and meaningful participation. This may include adopting protective measures under Article 68(1) to safeguard victims' safety, dignity, and privacy; and ensuring that participation does not expose victims to further harm. These measures are essential to enabling victims to engage with the Court without compromising the rights of the accused.

Fourth, I would encourage early and effective communication with victims through appropriate judicial orders. Although outreach is primarily the responsibility of the Registry, Chambers can play a decisive role by clarifying expectations, requesting timely updates, and ensuring that victims receive information in languages and formats they understand. Early engagement helps manage expectations, prevents misinformation, and strengthens victims' trust in the judicial process.

In sum, ensuring effective victim participation requires a proactive, principled, and context-sensitive judicial approach. By interpreting the Statute and Rules in a manner that facilitates access, protects victims' rights, and promotes transparency and communication, judges can strengthen both the fairness and the legitimacy of the Court's work.

5. In reaching a decision, how would you approach the need to balance the rights of an accused person and the rights of victims, which are both protected by the ICC's legal texts?

The Rome Statute requires judges to ensure that the rights of the accused and victims are fully respected and balanced within a framework that guarantees fairness, impartiality, and legitimacy. Articles 64, 67, and 68 provide guidance by defining the procedural guarantees for the accused, the protective and participatory rights of victims, and the Chamber's authority to structure proceedings in a manner that upholds both.

As such, the judges have the delicate task of balancing, on the one hand, strict adherence to the fair trial rights under article 67 and, on the other hand, the need to consider the views and concerns of victims, and their protection needs under article 68. In practice, this means that when judges assess evidence, rule on procedural requests, or determine the scope or modality of victims' participation, they must evaluate whether victims' personal interests are affected and whether their participation could adversely affect the rights of the defense.

This balancing exercise is inherently case-specific. Moreover, it requires the judges to clearly articulate how each right has been considered and how potential tensions have been resolved. For example, protective measures such as the distortion of voice or image or the complete redaction of the identity of witnesses, which seek to safeguard victims' well-being (Articles 64(2) and 68(1) and Rule 81(3)-(4)), should adequately ensure such measures do not impair the accused's ability to challenge evidence or prepare a defense.

In this sense, I believe it is essential to adopt a due process-oriented approach to criminal law that safeguards the rights of the accused to prevent arbitrary actions, as stressed by the Appeals Chamber in *Said*.

6. How do you see possibilities and limits of use of AI in the work of the Court? Do you have any experience in using AI in your work?

The incredible potential and multifaceted uses of AI make it almost impossible for the Court to disregard these technologies. Artificial intelligence offers important opportunities for the ICC to address some of the longstanding issues in international justice.

First, AI can support the Court's efficiency and access to justice, without replacing judicial reasoning. It may be used for automated transcription, document classification, and multilingual processing, to significantly reduce administrative burdens and help manage large volumes of evidence. Second, AI can strengthen transparency and public understanding of the Court's work. AI could also be useful in countering misinformation and improving communication, for instance, by producing accessible summaries and user-friendly interfaces. Third, AI may assist judges in ensuring coherence and consistency in legal analysis. AI-supported research tools can help identify relevant

jurisprudence, detect inconsistencies, and support comparative analysis. Such tools can improve the quality of legal reasoning when used under strict human oversight.

However, the use of AI must remain firmly grounded in judicial independence, due process, and the protection of fundamental rights. Balancing innovation with integrity is particularly crucial for a criminal tribunal whose legitimacy depends on trust and impartiality.

As a judge, I would welcome AI systems that enhance the Court's capacity to process evidence and improve the timeliness of proceedings, provided these models and technologies are subject to strict governance frameworks and internal policies that guarantee the Court's strict compliance with existing regulatory frameworks and human rights standards.

In this sense, I consider it essential that the use of these technologies be subject to constant monitoring and adjustment to reduce the risk of replicating or amplifying existing biases, such as those affecting less-represented, vulnerable, or marginalized communities. Moreover, as a judge, I believe it is crucial for the Court to develop its own internal policies for any AI systems within the Court that rely on strict human-in-the-loop review mechanisms, such as the inclusion of auditing mechanisms that test models for biases or errors across the different stages of their design, implementation, and improvement.

Similarly, I consider there to be fundamental and non-negotiable limits to the use of AI in judicial work. For example, AI must never determine guilt, innocence, sentencing, or reparations. As a judge, I would consider AI only as an assistant tool—never as a substitute for human judgment. In this sense, I would propose the adoption of internal policies that clearly define and limit functions that can and cannot be delegated to AI models.

Likewise, confidentiality and data protection impose strict limits. Any AI system used by the Court must comply with the highest standards of security, encryption, and data sovereignty. In this line, the Court should prioritize in-house development of models and systems rather than their development by third parties as this would also reduce the risks of potential hacking.

F. Additional information

1. Do you have any other nationality, other than the one indicated in your nomination, or have you ever requested another nationality?

I have dual nationality: Colombian by birth and Italian by naturalization.

2. Have you familiarized yourself with the conditions of service (which include the remuneration and the pensions' scheme) for the Judges of the Court? Are you aware of, and do you accept, the Terms and Conditions of work?

Yes, I have read and understood all the conditions of service for Judges at the Court, and I am willing to accept them.

3. Is there any other information which should be brought to the attention of the Committee and which might call into question your eligibility for judicial office?

I have no other information that could call into question my eligibility for judicial office.

G. Disclosure to the public

1. You have the option to make your answers to this questionnaire public. What is your preference in this regard?

I would like to make my answers to this questionnaire public.

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