

**Twenty-third session**

The Hague, 2-7 December 2024

**Annual report of the Head of
the Independent Oversight Mechanism**

Executive summary

Major Programme VII-5, the Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM), was established by the Assembly of States Parties at its eighth session in accordance with article 112, paragraph 4, of the Rome Statute. The purpose of the IOM is to provide comprehensive oversight of the Court and enhance its economy and efficiency through its mandate to conduct independent internal administrative investigations, evaluations and inspections.

The present report outlines the activities undertaken by the IOM from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024. During this period, the IOM received **43** new potential allegations of possible misconduct and initiated a detailed review of **25** cases. The IOM completed two evaluations, namely, the Evaluation of the Office of the Prosecutor's Strategic Plan 2019-2021 and the Evaluation of the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties. Finally, the IOM continued to collaborate with the Court, in the revision of the Court's regulatory framework, and the Assembly, through the provision of input and technical expertise in discussions related to the assessment of the Independent Expert Review recommendations touching upon the work of the IOM and developed an Evaluation Policy for the Court.

* Reissued for technical reasons

I. Introduction

1. This annual report is submitted to the Assembly of States Parties (the Assembly) pursuant to paragraph 38 of the IOM Operational Mandate (Resolution ICC-ASP/19/Res.6., Annex II), and covers the IOM's operations during the period from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024.

II. Policy Matters

A. Assembly Matters

2. As in previous reporting periods, the IOM continued to participate, where relevant, in meetings of the Bureau of Assembly and its Working Groups, most notably the Hague Working Group facilitations on Budget Management Oversight and on the review of the work and operational mandate of the IOM. During the period under review, the discussions in such facilitations continued to focus on the assessment of recommendations from the report of the Independent Expert Review (IER), which touch upon the functions of the IOM. The IOM also participated in relevant meetings of the Review Mechanism.

B. Harmonisation of the IOM Mandate with the Regulatory Framework of the Court

3. The IOM continues to collaborate with the Court in the development of regulatory frameworks consistent with the IOM Operational Mandate. Future work in this area could include an update of the Court's 2014 Anti-Fraud Policy and a new policy regarding Conflict of Interest. The IOM has also developed a new Evaluation Policy for the Assembly to endorse, to govern the conduct of evaluations at the Court, which is further detailed below.

III. Summary of IOM Activities

A. Investigations

4. During the reporting period, the IOM continued with its core mandate of providing oversight to the Court by responding to allegations of potential misconduct. In doing so, the IOM first conducts an Intake phase, where it determines whether the allegation falls within its mandate, *i.e.*, the facts alleged, if found to be true, would amount to unsatisfactory conduct or misconduct under the Court's regulatory framework. If so, the IOM formally records the matter as a case and typically conducts a Preliminary Assessment to determine whether the allegation merits a Full Investigation, by considering the credibility, materiality, and verifiability of the allegation. In a Full Investigation, the IOM reviews all inculpatory and exculpatory information available to either substantiate or refute the allegation.

5. The IOM also continued to meet with individuals who wished to discuss potential complaints and seek the IOM's guidance in terms of the applicable process should a formal complaint be made. If such a consultation does not lead to a formal complaint it is not recorded as a "case" in its system, but is nevertheless logged in the IOM's internal systems.

1. Statistics

6. During this reporting period, the IOM received **43** reports of potential misconduct, **18** of which were closed at the Intake stage, mostly either for not falling within the IOM mandate or constituting duplicate allegations, although **7** of these were closed as consultations, where the complainant wanted to have an initial discussion with the IOM but not file a formal complaint.


7. The remaining **25** matters accordingly constituted allegations of misconduct that led to formal cases. **9** of these cases were closed after a Preliminary Assessment determined that the allegations were not sufficiently credible, material or verifiable to warrant a Full Investigation, while **6** led to Full Investigations. The remaining **10** cases are still pending Preliminary Assessments at the end of the reporting period.

8. When factoring in the cases carried over from the last the reporting period, the IOM completed, during this reporting period, **9** Full Investigations and **21** Preliminary Assessments.

Table 1: IOM’s Investigative Caseload, 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024

<p>New Cases Received (total: 43)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allegations closed at intake: 18 • Cases closed after Preliminary Assessment: 9 • Preliminary Assessments pending: 10 • Full Investigations initiated: 6
<p>Matters carried over from last reporting period (total: 18)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cases closed after Preliminary Assessment: 6 • Preliminary Assessment Pending: 2 • Full Investigations: 10
<p>Investigations (total: 16)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completed: 9 • Ongoing: 7

9. After a steady increase in the investigation case load in the previous years (as seen in the graph below), there has been a significant decrease in the number of allegations received by the IOM which led to an investigation. It is impossible to determine at this early stage whether this is due to a decrease in reporting or the deterrent effect of the Court’s investigatory and disciplinary processes. This trend should be closely followed in the next reporting period, as this could also impact the resourcing of the IOM.



10. It is also worth noting that the ability of the IOM to conduct timely investigations has also been affected by the high number of investigation subjects who are on sick leave at the time of the investigation or who fall ill when notified of an investigation. In these cases, the IOM suspends the investigation not to aggravate any health issues, but the mechanisms in place at the Court to monitor these leaves and ensure that they are legitimate are lacking compared with other international organizations, including those in the United Nations system.

2. *Completed Full Investigations*

(a) Workplace Harassment and Abuse of Authority by Elected Official

11. On **2 December 2022**, the IOM received an anonymous complaint in hard copy alleging that an elected official had treated personnel of the Court in a manner which, if true, could constitute workplace harassment. Specifically, the complaint noted that the elected official had mistreated and provided “violent feedback” to personnel. The examples provided included using derogatory adjectives, assigning personal tasks, and repeatedly calling outside working hours for personal or non-urgent Court matters.

12. The IOM completed its investigation on **10 January 2024**. It was by some distance the largest it has ever conducted in terms of numbers of affected individuals and witnesses, with over 50 witnesses having been interviewed. The majority of personnel who worked with the elected official reported issues with their manner of communicating and their work methods. Examples included raising their voice or speaking to personnel in a belittling manner, frequently contacting personnel outside working hours, requiring assistance for tasks outside their responsibilities, and a general disregard for other responsibilities of personnel, all of which many considered hostile and unhealthy. Several specific incidents of the above were highlighted and recalled both by affected individuals and personnel who generally appreciated working with the elected official.

13. The elected official denied the allegations in their entirety, noting that their firm character and clear manner of speaking may have been misperceived culturally. They added that they considered the allegations to have been orchestrated as part of a conspiracy against them, to interfere with the performance of their duties.

14. The IOM concluded that there was sufficient evidence to substantiate some, although not all, of the allegations. In those instances, it found that the behaviour of the elected official could reasonably be expected or perceived to create an intimidating, hostile, and offensive work environment, as provided by the Court’s Administrative Instruction on Addressing Discrimination, Harassment, including Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Authority (Harassment AI), and which caused personnel to fear being on the receiving end of such behaviour.

15. On **10 January 2024**, the IOM submitted its report to the competent Organ of the Court pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and informed the Assembly of the results of its investigation. Any decision regarding what measures, if any, will be taken with respect to the elected official is still **pending**.

(b) Lack of Cooperation and Interference with IOM Investigation by Elected Official

16. On **3 October 2023**, during the IOM investigation in the aforementioned case, another elected official refused to cooperate with the IOM investigation by refusing to answer IOM questions during a formal interview. When reminded of their obligation to cooperate under relevant ASP resolutions and Court-issued instruments, the elected official informed the IOM that they were of the view that the elected official could “do whatever [they] see fit” and invited the IOM to refer their behaviour to the Assembly if it so wished, before abruptly terminating the interview. Subsequently, the IOM received

reports alleging that the elected official had approached one of the affected individuals in the underlying investigation, inquiring about their participation in said investigation, leading the affected individual to feel intimidated to the extent of considering withdrawing from it.

17. To mitigate any further risk of potential witness intimidation, the IOM recommended that measures be taken to prevent the elected official in question interacting with other such witnesses, but was informed that the existing regulatory framework did not allow for such mitigating measures. While the IOM disagreed, it did note this potential gap in the regulatory framework regarding the accountability of elected officials, and informed the Assembly that they should address it.

18. On **30 November 2023**, the IOM concluded its investigation, finding that the elected official failed to cooperate with the IOM without reasonable excuse, in violation of the regulatory framework of the Court. The elected official was further found to have unduly interfered with the investigation into allegations against another elected official, breaching confidentiality and engaging in actions, although unintended, which had the effect of intimidating at least two personnel.

19. On **28 February 2024**, a **written reprimand** against the elected official was issued in accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

(c) Allegation of Lack of Fitness for Duty

20. On **17 February 2023**, the IOM received an allegation regarding unsatisfactory conduct by a staff member of the Office of the Prosecutor, attributed to possible alcohol abuse and/or use of other intoxicating substances reported to have rendered the staff member unfit for duty, in a manner that could have caused damage to the reputation of the Court. The Prosecutor elected to suspend the staff member from duty pending the investigation.

21. On **29 November 2023**, the IOM completed its investigation, finding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that on two occasions while on mission the staff member was intoxicated to a degree that it had been reported by colleagues. The IOM observed that the Court's regulatory framework was unclear as to whether being intoxicated in such instances as reported necessarily constitutes unsatisfactory conduct, hence it was not in a position to make any recommendation as to whether disciplinary action was warranted, and referred the matter to the Prosecutor, who elected to initiate disciplinary proceedings, which are still **pending**.

22. The IOM also recommended to the Court to clarify its policies on the use of alcohol and other substances while on duty travel.

(d) Workplace Harassment and Sexual Harassment

23. On **14 March 2023**, the IOM received an allegation of verbal assault by one staff member against another, followed by an email to all personnel in a large section regarding the incident, which may have created an intimidating, degrading, hostile, humiliating and offensive work environment, potentially amounting to workplace harassment. The IOM expanded the scope of its investigation to include additional information it received during the course of its investigation, indicating that the staff member may also have engaged in sexual harassment by sending messages of a sexual nature to another staff member. On **13 April 2023**, the IOM received allegations that this same staff member sexually harassed an intern in the section by making inappropriate comments of sexual nature. On **3 November 2023**, the IOM substantiated the allegation of sexual harassment against the intern and only partially the allegation of workplace harassment, and recommended disciplinary action.

24. On **24 May 2024**, the Registrar, having considered the advice of the Disciplinary Advisory Board and the IOM investigation report, **terminated** the staff member's appointment with compensation in lieu of notice pursuant to Staff Rule 110.6 (a) (viii).

(e) Providing Unauthorised Access and Failure to Declare Conflict of Interest

25. On **31 May 2023**, the IOM received an allegation of potential misconduct by a Court staff member for allegedly granting an unauthorised person access to the Court's systems, equipment, and facilities on various occasions. In the course of its investigation, the IOM identified that the personnel in question may have failed to declare a conflict of interest regarding their personal relationship with the unauthorised individual.

26. On **24 April 2024**, the IOM completed its investigation concluding that there was sufficient evidence to substantiate that the personnel in question did give an unauthorised person access to the Court's confidential and highly sensitive internal systems, equipment, and facilities, which may have been influenced by a conflict of interest. The IOM recommended appropriate disciplinary action be taken against the staff member, and the matter is still **pending** disciplinary proceedings.

27. The IOM also recommended that the Court consider establishing clear written policies regarding access to sensitive areas and that the Security and Safety Section be stringent in searching people who gain unauthorised access to restricted areas prior to allowing them to leave the building.

(f) Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming of an International Civil Servant

28. On **3 April 2023** the IOM received an allegation of workplace harassment against a senior staff member whereby they would have, *inter alia*, used condescending and derogatory language in relation to personnel in a Country Office and made discriminatory comments against the population of that country.

29. On **11 July 2024**, the IOM concluded its investigation finding that one comment made by the staff member towards another staff member amounted to unwelcome conduct that could reasonably be perceived to have caused offence or humiliation and to create an intimidating or offensive work environment. The IOM also determined that another of the staff member's comments towards the population of the country where the office is located was inappropriate, and did not reflect the values of the Court or what was expected of an International Civil Servant. The IOM accordingly recommended that appropriate administrative and/or disciplinary action be taken. The matter is currently **pending** a decision.

(g) Discrimination and Abuse of Authority

30. On **14 September 2023**, the IOM received a report alleging that two staff members in the Security and Safety Section made inappropriate comments towards a member of the public regarding their citizenship.

31. The IOM concluded its investigation on **26 July 2024**, finding that one staff member had exhibited poor judgement by making a joke with a member of public, which the latter genuinely and reasonably took offence to. The investigation found that the second staff member had not been involved in the comment. The IOM considered this a lapse of judgement, which was better addressed through managerial action rather than discipline. Further, the IOM found that the matter had been escalated because of a lack of rigour in the processes to address such incidents internally in the section, and recommended that staff in the Security and Safety Section be reminded to follow the rules and procedures on preservation of evidence when dealing with complaints, which in this case was lacking.

3. *Selected Cases Closed Without a Full Investigation*

(a) Breach of Code of Judicial Ethics

32. On **29 February 2024**, the IOM received a report of potential misconduct against a Judge, alleging that they may have breached the Code of Judicial Ethics by improperly attempting to influence the 2024 Presidency elections, through a violation of the Guidelines on the Procedure for the Election of the Presidency. The report also included possible irregularities in connection to various absences from the Court. In the course of its Preliminary Assessment, the IOM came upon additional information that the Judge may have further breached the Code of Judicial Ethics by sharing confidential information with a journalist.

33. On **12 July 2024**, the IOM concluded its Preliminary Assessment finding that while there may have been a breach of the Election Guidelines, it did not have an impact on the actual elections. With respect to the interview with a journalist, the IOM found the allegation to be credible, material and verifiable to warrant a Full Investigation; however, the IOM did not consider it to be judicious use of its resources to initiate such a Full Investigation given the end of the Judge's tenure. With respect to the absences from office, the IOM noted that the Judges' entitlements with respect to, for instance, Annual Leave, Sick Leave and Remote Work are not clearly set out in the Court's regulatory framework and/or have not been clearly communicated to them, with no enforcement mechanism available. Accordingly, the IOM recommended to the Presidency, with support of the Registrar, to consider a revised system whereby Judges' absences can be recorded and/or monitored to ensure accountability.

(b) Conflict of Interest

34. The IOM also reviewed allegations received on **17 August 2023** concerning a possible conflict of interest of the Prosecutor in dealing with an active situation. The IOM found the complaint to not require a Full Investigation, as the IOM did confirm that public statements were made regarding recusals where necessary, both by the Office of the Prosecutor and any publication of decisions by the relevant chambers, and none of the incidents alleged gave rise to a conflict of interest, or a perception thereof.

(c) Misconduct by IOM Investigators

35. The Head of the IOM also received, on **31 January 2023**, allegations that IOM investigators engaged in misconduct in the course of a witness interview, with the complainant alleging that they had been subjected to "a demeaning, intimidating, belittling, humiliating and unrelenting series of challenges to the answers [they were] giving, all designed to place [them]... in an unfavourable light". In accordance with paragraph 51 of its Operational Mandate, the Head of the IOM consulted with the President of the Assembly, and, to avoid any perception of lack of objectivity or impartiality, sought an external review of the allegations by an Investigation Service of a United Nations organization.

36. On **31 October 2023**, the IOM received the report from the external investigators, who found, upon review of the transcript and the audio-recording of the interview, that (a) the questions, statements and verbal attitude of the investigators could not be considered "aggressive"; (b) argumentation and questioning by the investigators were justified by the need to obtain further information and understand the Complainant's grievances; and that what was perceived as "challenges" rather consisted of attempts by investigators to resolve perceived inconsistencies; (c) they could not identify any attempt to "place the Complainant under an "unfavourable light", "exonerate the perpetrator", or to otherwise support any particular theory; and (d) they could not identify any instance where the investigators' attitude could have reasonably be seen as violating the Complainant's dignity, or otherwise constituted harassment, discrimination or abuse of power.

(d) Alleged Violation of Harassment AI by an Elected Official

37. On **3 May 2024**, the IOM was informed of allegations that an elected official would have engaged in behaviour in violation of the Court’s Harassment AI. As the allegation was received from a third party, the Harassment AI required the IOM to “first seek the views of the affected individual [alleged victim] before deciding whether to proceed with an investigation”. The IOM did so and the alleged affected individual declined to pursue a formal complaint with the IOM, including when it was suggested that any investigation could be referred to an external entity. Importantly, the alleged affected individual refused to explicitly confirm or deny to the IOM the factual basis of what had been reported by the third party to the IOM. Accordingly, the IOM determined that no investigation was necessary at this stage, but recommended some measures to safeguard everyone’s rights in the future, both that of the possible victim as well as the alleged subject.

B. Evaluations

38. An evaluation is an independent, rigorous, impartial, systematic and objective assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of an activity, project, programme, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, operational area or institutional performance. It considers intended, as well as unintended, positive and negative consequences, and assesses what works well and less well. Its results are intended to be useful for decision-making and overall organisational accountability and learning.

39. The evaluations conducted by the IOM broadly play a dual role: they inform key stakeholders about the performance and results achieved for accountability purposes, and they provide learning and insight in relation to areas that work well and those that need improvement.

1. Evaluations Conducted

40. During this reporting period, the IOM issued two evaluation reports, namely the evaluation of the Office of the Prosecutor’s Strategic Plan 2019-2021 (OSP) and the evaluation of the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties (SASP).

(a) Evaluation of the Office of the Prosecutor’s Strategic Plan 2019-2021

41. The Evaluation of the Court’s Office of the Prosecutor’s Strategic Plan (OSP) 2019 – 2021 was requested by the Prosecutor in 2022 to take stock of the results and performance of the Office in the 2019-2021 period and to draw on lessons learnt. The evaluation responded to three questions, namely, how clear and coherent was the OSP and its processes; how effective was its delivery; and how efficient and adaptable was the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in implementing the OSP.

42. The IOM issued its evaluation report in **May 2024**. It found that the overall strategy and goals of the OSP were clear and coherent, however, that this was less evident at the level of the sub-goals and some specific goals’ strategic importance was questionable. The evaluation found that the planning process was well established and understood by OTP staff but lacked their engagement. There appeared to be a disconnect between strategic planning and implementation, possibly due to different teams being involved in developing the plan and monitoring systems and their limited use by staff throughout the implementation period. The performance monitoring system evolved since 2015 and saw refinements during the 2019-2021 cycle and while used by senior management, lacked overall progress updates at the division and section level.

43. Despite its internal and external challenges, the OTP achieved significant milestones in its core activities and fostered a culture of continuous learning, through for example the engagement of numerous internal working groups addressing several areas of improvement, using a lesson learnt

process and database, and conducting lessons learnt exercises. The self-assessment of the policy on sexual and gender-based crimes over a period of its 7 years of implementation contributed to accountability, providing insights into policy application across all OTP phases. The 2019-2021 period saw efforts to strengthen leadership, enhance staff-wellbeing, raise awareness on gender and diversity and manage resources effectively. However, unresolved interpersonal tensions amongst some senior management impacted efficiency and workplace culture.

44. The IOM noted limited scope to assess results and performance with regard to Strategic Goal 3 (securing arrest warrants) and Goal 6 (complementarity) due to the limited OTP data and information provided. Some key commitments were achieved just before the former Prosecutor's term ended and certain projects were advanced during the COVID-19 pandemic as they became more relevant during this period (e.g., online investigations). The OTP maintained activities despite disruptions but faced challenges in implementing some parts of the plan. The transition to the new strategy cycle brought new priorities while building on previous achievements such as enforcing situation completion strategies.

45. The IOM issued three recommendations for the OTP management related to strategic planning, better staff engagement and improved communication on results and performance to make future plans more relevant and motivating for staff.

(b) Evaluation of the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties

46. The evaluation was requested by the Assembly to assess the work of its Secretariat (SASP), focusing on governance, resources, effectiveness, streamlining of functions and geographical representation. The goal was to provide recommendations for improving the SASP functions and structure to better serve the Assembly.

47. The evaluation found that the SASP client orientation and service provision were generally satisfactory, receiving high ratings in areas such as administrative support, conference management, special events organisation and analytical reporting. However, it identified the need for a recurrent client feedback mechanism to continuously improve its service provision. Despite the generally satisfactory response collected in the evaluation on the SASP service provision, significant improvements were identified as needed in its work methods, particularly in the planning, monitoring, evaluation, quality assurance and reporting systems to better manage workload and provide support to the Assembly more effectively.

48. The evaluation also found that the SASP staffing resources were sufficient, compared to similar secretariats of international organisations, although its current inefficient organizational structure made a precise determination difficult. The evaluation also noted that SASP staff morale was low, notably due to structural issues, inefficient workload distribution, underused skills, and poor management practices, necessitating specific management actions for improvement. The evaluation invited the Assembly to replace the existing structure of some staff members assigned exclusively to some specific portfolios towards a more functional model, which would promote a flexible and more efficient workload distribution. The IOM also found that the accountability mechanism within the SASP to be deficient, for example, in terms of performance management.

49. The evaluation report included four recommendations addressing these issues.

2. Support to Decentralized Evaluations

50. As per the IOM Operational Mandate, the Evaluation function also supports decentralised evaluations and provides quality assurance. During the reporting period, the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) benefitted from IOM's quality assurance of its Performance Monitoring system. The IOM also provided advisory services to the "Mid-term evaluation of the reparations implemented by the Trust

Fund for Victims in Mali, as part of ICC case against Ahmad al-Faqi Al-Mahdi” conducted by the University of Edinburgh and commissioned by the TFV.

51. The IOM has also engaged with both the Secretariat of the TFV and its Board of Directors to discuss future joint collaboration, including possible evaluations of programmes and projects put into place in connection with Court-issued reparation orders.

3. Evaluation policy

52. Since 2017, the IOM has successfully conducted seven independent evaluations, demonstrating a growing maturity, demand, capability and experience in this critical strategic area for the Court. The IOM accordingly considered that it was timely and necessary to develop a formal Evaluation Policy (the Policy) of the Court, to strengthen and anchor the evaluation mandate in the regulatory framework of the Court, given this growing practice and to supplement the provisions of the IOM Operational Mandate with respect to evaluations.

53. Once adopted, the Policy will cover all evaluations conducted at the Court, including by the IOM. It was developed in line with the United Nations Evaluation Group norms and standards for conducting evaluations, and in consultation with both internal and external stakeholders. The Policy defines the evaluation purpose, concepts, rules and use of evaluation within the Court; the institutional framework and roles and responsibilities; measures to safeguard evaluation independence and accountability; benchmarks for financing the evaluation function; measures to ensure the quality of evaluations and post-evaluation follow-up; a framework for decentralized evaluations; and provision for a periodic review or external assessment of the Policy.

54. The IOM has submitted this Policy to the Assembly, with a view to having it adopted in a formal Assembly Resolution.

4. Evaluation Survey

55. The IOM conducted an online survey aimed to gather critical feedback from staff, management and elected officials on IOM-commissioned evaluations at the Court. It assessed experiences of participants but also awareness levels of staff in general in relation to the evaluation function, mandate, process and resources (e.g., evaluation reports). The next IOM annual report will summarise key survey results.

C. Inspection

56. An inspection is a special, unscheduled, on-the-spot verification of an activity directed towards the resolution of problems which may or may not have been previously identified.

57. No inspection activity was conducted during this reporting period.

D. Outreach Activities and External Collaborations

58. Through continuous outreach activities, the IOM has continued to play a key role in raising staff awareness and understanding of their rights and obligations as Court personnel and International Civil Servants, as well as the IOM’s three functions.

59. During this reporting period, the IOM continued contributing to the Court’s onboarding programme for new staff and interns, as well as participating for the first time in specialised onboarding for the newly elected Judges.

60. The IOM has also continued to support the Court in the development of an anti-harassment training programme.

61. The IOM continued its active engagement with professional networks, most notably the Conference of International Investigators (CII), the United Nations Representatives of Investigation Services (UN-RIS), the United Nations Evaluations Group (UNEG) and the European Evaluation Society (EES). These engagements have facilitated the exchange of best practices and strengthened the IOM's network with other similar international organisations' evaluation and investigation functions. The Senior Evaluation Specialist, for instance, continues to be a co-convenor of the UNEG peer review of evaluation functions working group.

IV. IOM Staffing and Administrative Matters

62. During this reporting period, the IOM staff included: one P4 Senior Evaluation Specialist, one P4 Senior Investigator, one P3 (GTA) Investigator, one P2 Associate Investigator and one staff on GS-OL providing administrative and substantive support to the office. The Associate Investigator was recruited and began work on 15 March 2024. The IOM also needed to cover extended leave periods during that time.

63. The Senior Evaluation Specialist was supported by two funded Visiting Professionals during the reporting period, which enabled capacity and progress with the ongoing evaluations, as well as the Evaluation Policy and quality assurance, among other areas of work. In order to continue supporting its evaluation capacity, the IOM has submitted a proposal in its Proposed Programme Budget for 2025 in the form of a National UN Volunteer Specialist Evaluator. This modality is a contribution of the IOM to the Court's savings and efficiencies strategy and is part of the United Nations Young and Emerging Evaluator (UNV YEEs) Programme. The IOM has submitted this proposal following consultations with the Human Resources Section of the Court.

V. Final remarks

64. In accordance with paragraph 39 of the IOM Operational Mandate, the IOM has circulated a draft of this annual report to the Heads of Organs, giving them the opportunity to provide comments for the IOM's consideration. The comments received were duly considered and incorporated in this report where appropriate. As contemplated in the above-referenced paragraph, the Heads of Organ were also informed of the opportunity to provide its views in an annex to the report, and none of the Heads of Organs indicated a desire to do so.
